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 This study looks at cyber attacks on the international level and how they may be unique 
from conventional domains of conflict, which in turn impact international response to such 
conflicts. Specifically, this study questions how the differences in the relationships between 
cyber and kinetic attacks affect international response. A qualitative social science study was 
conducted in order to evaluate the question posed. A comparative case study analysis was 
conducted using Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2013-ongoing) as the case studies. Both of these 
conflicts displayed both cyber and kinetic attacks. Kinetic attacks, cyber attacks, and 
international response for each of the case studies was analyzed. The goal was to observe the 
applicability of ‘armed attack’ in each situation as well as the rate of the international response. 
Coding of critical primary sources related to the issue area were used as well. The primary 
sources used were four congressional testimonies on the conflicts used as the case studies. The 
main themes that were drawn out of this form of content analysis were conflict, assistance, and 
response.  
 The results of the data analysis revealed that there is a difference of response when it 
comes to kinetic versus cyber domain. With kinetic attacks, a conventional framework can 
commonly be applied and countries are prepared to respond in a direct manner whether that is 
with economic consequences, diplomatic intervention, verbal condemnation, and/or physical 
action. With cyber attacks, issues of attribution and lack of concrete nature of attacks can likely 
contribute to hesitation of nation states to respond to such action. As the case studies used 
illustrated, cyber attacks can contribute to kinetic attacks and cause damage on their own accord 
as well. This means that such attacks cannot be taken lightly, and an applicable framework needs 
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to be established. This study established the need for such a framework and paved the way to 
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 Over the last few decades, the cyber domain has steadily emerged as a prominent area of 
aggression between nation states, private corporations, and non-state actors. It first started out as 
causing disruption to computer systems and causing confusion but has advanced as a method of 
stealing adversaries’ sensitive information, disrupting critical infrastructure, and even causing 
physical destruction. One of the most well-known examples of such an attack is Stuxnet. Stuxnet 
was considered a major turning point in the cyber domain because it was used as a weapon to 
physically destroy a particular target, in this case being the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz. 
Scholars have pondered over the idea of ‘cyberwar’ and Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, 
in 2012, warned of a ‘cyber pearl harbor.’ The cyber domain currently faces many unknowns 
involving its potential uses and its limitations. This poses many significant challenges. This 
paper will focus in on one of those specific challenges including how the international 
community should respond to cyber attacks.  
 The question that this paper attempts to answer is: how does the difference between cyber 
and kinetic attacks effect international response? Further, this seeks to analyze if a new 
framework for evaluating cyber conflict as opposed to kinetic conflict is required. With cyber 
coming to the forefront of conflicts between nations, it has become critical for the security of the 
United States and its allies to understand how to respond to cyber attacks imposed by adversaries 
in order to prevent further escalation of conflict, as well as potential loss of life and destruction 
of critical infrastructure. This idea was interestingly raised with the Estonia cyber attack in 2007 
when Estonia questioned why its NATO allies did not come to its defense in the same manner 
they would have if it was conventional armed attack. Malicious actors had targeted websites that 
included Estonian government entities and media outlets. This occurred amid a conflict between 
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Russia and Estonia over the relocation of a Soviet-era statue in Tallin. There are distinctions 
between cyber and other more conventional forms of attack that make it difficult to decide if 
defense from other nation states was required in this type of situation. Therefore it is essential to 
evaluate those differences and how they impact international response. Attacks that followed the 
one that occurred in Estonia continued to raise this question and cause confusion from a lack of 
agreement from the international community on how to respond. This study will look specifically 
at two case studies that both involve cyber and kinetic aspects. The first case study that will be 
evaluated is Georgia 2008, in which malicious cyber activity turned to conventional warfare. The 
second case study that will be evaluated is Ukraine 20131 where there is a mixture of kinetic and 
cyber activity. Particularly, cyber activity is used to generate kinetic effects. The two events will 
be evaluated in a comparative case study analysis. Critical primary source documents from both 
events will also be coded in order to evaluate prominent themes in relation to the question 
presented in the research study.  
Literature Review  
Definitions  
Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions sets forth that whenever two or more 
states resort to armed force it can be considered that international armed conflict exists.2 But for 
international armed conflict to exist, the use of force must be conducted by the state and not by 
private individuals even if they are acting on behalf of the state. An armed conflict must consist 
of an international component and an armed component.3 Article 49(1) found in the 1977 
 
1 This case study begins in 2013, but the conflict continues into present day. To maintain specificity for the purpose 
of this particular study, only the initial conflict (kinetic and cyber) will be evaluated. This will encompass 2013-
2017.  
2 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 




Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines ‘attacks’ as “acts of violence 
against the adversary, whether in offence or in defense.”4 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states 
that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” It also touches on the 
fact that action cannot be taken in manner that is not in accordance with the goals set forth by the 
UN.5 Article 51 of the UN Charter puts forth that states have a right to collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.6 One of the current issues when 
it comes to the cyber domain is lack of clarity of terminology and key terms. In order to have a 
clear understanding of what is being discussed further in this research project, specific 
definitions will be put forth in accordance with the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers 
and Studies, an initiative of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Critical 
infrastructure is “the systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to society that the 
incapacity or destruction of such may have debilitating impact on the security, economy, public 
health or safety, environment, or any combination of these matters.”7 Cyberspace is “the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures that includes the internet, 
telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers” 
(cyberspace and cyber domain may be used interchangeable in this paper).8 According to the 
National Research Council, there are a variety of definitions for cyberattack, but the one that will 
be used is “a hostile or unfriendly action taken against a computer system or network regardless 
 
4 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts” 
5 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Article 2. 
6 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Article 51.  
7 National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, “Cybersecurity Glossary” 
8 National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, “Cybersecurity Glossary” 
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of purpose or outcome.9 But also, it is important to note that a hostile cyber operation can be an 
exploitation or an attack. A cyber exploitation is “an action intended to exfiltrate digitally stored 
information that should be kept away from unauthorized parties that should not have access to 
it.”10 
International Legal Understanding of Cyber Attacks  
 In the modern setting, legal scholars have evaluated the applicability of certain doctrines 
to cyberspace. For some time, the main view of nation states which are members of the United 
Nations has been that force and armed conflict (as put forth in the UN charter) applies to military 
attacks or violence. Alternatively, Article 2(4) can be looked at from the perspective of what 
instruments are used or the rights of individuals that are at stake. 11 Under Article 51, if a cyber 
attack is classified as an ‘armed attack’ it can be deemed legal to use force to retaliate in self-
defense, or in defense of UN allies. One of the key factors involved in Article 51 and a deciding 
factor in whether self-defense is applicable is the characteristic of imminence.12 Under the 
Obama Administration, in a legal review, it was put forth that the United States has the power to 
conduct strikes when an armed attack is imminent specifically in the cyber context. It has been 
made clear, via the broad agreement by scholars, that cyber attacks that result in death or 
physical destruction of critical infrastructure fall under the Article 51 definition of and armed 
attack.  
The Tallinn Manual, originally published in 2013, served to address cyber operations and 
how the rules of international law can govern such incidents. The experts that put together the 
 
9 National Research Council, “At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and Issues,” 
29-52. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Matthew C. Waxman, “Cyber Attacks as ‘Force’ Under UN Charter Article 2(4),” 43-54. 
12 Ryan J. Hayward, “Evaluating The ‘Imminence’ Of A Cyber Attack For Purposes Of Anticipatory Self-Defense.”  
 
 5 
Tallinn Manual had two perspectives on how a cyber attack may fall under the category of an 
‘armed attack.’ First, the Tallinn Manual puts forth that “any use of force that injures or kills 
persons or damages or destroys property” would qualify.13 This point had unanimous agreement 
from the experts that put together the Tallinn Manual. The second point, which also holds 
significant weight to it but did not have unanimous support, was that its applicability to an 
‘armed attack’ could be determined by its scaled of negative consequences imposed, even if 
death or direct destruction is not involved.14 Some scholars argued that this opened the door to 
less clarity and more confusion on what would be applicable as an ‘armed attack’ within the 
cyber domain.  
 Some scholars argue that cyberwar is a misleading term as mixing cyberattacks with the 
concept of war is inaccurate.15 On the other hand, scholars such as Michael Schmitt, one of the 
experts behind the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyberwarfare, push 
back on that idea.16 They see that both jus ad bellum and jus in bello can apply to cyber 
operations.17 The manual emphasizes cyber operations as a new form of weapon allowing for 
law to be applicable to the concept. But even scholars who agree with the concept put forth by 
the manual argues that it is not simple to place cyber actions on a framework that easily applies 
to kinetic conventional attacks considering factors such as violence, physical destruction, and 
motive.18 These aspects are not as easily measured when it comes to observing cyberattacks on 
their own, especially when the aggression involves a combination of cyber and kinetic actions.19 
Cyberwar: Strategic Thought  
 
13 Michael N. Schmitt, “Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.” 
14 Ibid. 
15 Christopher Finlay, “Just War, Cyber War, and the Concept of Violence,” 357-376. 
16 Michael Schmitt, “Attack as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context,” 283- 293. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Christopher Finlay, “Just War, Cyber War, and the Concept of Violence,” 357-376. 
19 Ibid.  
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Most, if not all, scholars recognize that one of the key differences between the cyber 
domain and conventional domains of warfare (sea, land, air, and space) is that there is no 
concrete space in which it takes form. Cyberspace is a replicable construct which means it can 
take many shapes in a variety of unique locations. Some scholars have chosen to compare the 
unique nature of cyberwar to nuclear war with dramatic long-term effects, but scholars such as 
Libicki have pushed back on that claim viewing cyberwar as temporary and rapidly over.20 
Bayles saw similarity between chemical and biological weapons and cyber weapons because of 
the large number of people they could target at the same time, but saw the key difference being 
that cyber weapons affect individuals indirectly rather than directly.21 The differences between 
the cyber domain and conventional domains of warfare also highlight the parallel between the 
cyber domain and other forms of asymmetric domains of conflict. Looking at non-conventional 
forms of attack such as disinformation campaigns, use of biological or chemical weapons, or 
targeted killings, a lack of concrete nature and the unique nature of direct and indirect effects can 
also be noted.  
Rid, when assessing the concept of cyberwar, brings in the fundamental concept of war 
put forth by Clausewitz. Clausewitz categorizes war by its violent nature, instrumental character, 
and political nature.22 Rid agrees with this categorization and sees an act of force as 
straightforward in nature. He gives examples of F-16 striking targets or improvised explosive 
devices playing to the same end goal.23 The end goal, in Clausewitz view, is when the enemy is 
forced to accept their lose and whatever consequences that may entail. Rid argues that cyberwar 
falls into a completely different category, opposed to conventional forms of war, as the act of 
 
20 Elinor C. Sloan, “Modern Military Strategy: Cyberwar,” 142-159.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Thomas Rid, “Cyber war will not take place: what is cyber war,” 2013.  
23 Ibid.  
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force when it comes to cyber is not as clear and direct.24 A cyber attack involves a complex chain 
of events, causes, and consequences (direct and indirect). Rid takes Clausewitz criteria for use of 
force of war and deems that cyber cannot meet all the criteria25, and therefore cyberwar is 
unlikely to become a reality.26 In essence, malicious cyber activity will occur, but categorizing it 
as cyberwar will prove to be nearly impossible under the given criteria. On the other hand, 
scholars such as Junio and Liff argue that there is a possible criteria under which cyberwar can, 
and likely will, occur. Liff sees the possibility of cyberwar capabilities potentially increasing the 
frequency of war and conflict on the international stage.27 But Liff does not see such capabilities 
encouraging kinetic warfare under most circumstances. In other words, he sees acts of 
cyberwarfare occurring between actors in the context of larger political conflict, which makes the 
role of cyber actions less significant to the overall conflict.28  Junio sees cyberwar as a highly 
costly and probable event; within this definition cyberwar is something that can involve a variety 
of consequences ranging from destruction of military capabilities to destruction of critical 
infrastructure.29 
The US Cyber Command sees the principal effect of cyber warfare as denying the enemy 
freedom of action in the cyber domain.30 The strategic goal of offensive cyberwar can include 
coercion, assertion of status, or disabling capabilities of an enemy. Various scholars have pointed 
to the fact that cyberwar is a supporting form of warfare, and the US Cyber Command seems to 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 The criteria are the 3 elements of war discussed earlier: violent, instrumental, and political. Rid argues that there 
are little examples of cyber attacks that meet one of the elements and no examples of cyber attacks that meet all of 
the elements.  
26 Thomas Rid, “Cyber war will not take place: what is cyber war,” 2013. 
27 Adam P. Liff, “The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War, Redux: Liff Responds to 
Junio,” 134-138. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Timothy J. Junio, “How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate,” 1-8. 
30 Elinor C. Sloan, “Modern Military Strategy: Cyberwar,” 142-159. 
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back up this assertion by putting forth that cyber weapons can mainly be used in combination 
with conventional military operations.31  
Relationship Between Cyber Attacks and Kinetic Attacks  
 
 There are several key differences between cyberspace and kinetic attacks, or further 
between cyberwarfare and conventional warfare. As mentioned previously, one key difference is 
the lack of concrete space in which cyberspace falls into. Another difference is that a cyberattack 
has the potential to cause widespread damage in a very short period of time that can affect the 
functioning of society and lead to indirect casualties. The rapid nature and the ability to attack 
anywhere at any time increases the risk involved in cyberspace.32 The cyber battlefield is also 
seen as unique because it does not necessarily require the same level of training and education as 
forms of conventional warfare require. Phillips highlights that this is why many non-state actors 
engage in cyber warfare. 33Cyber attacks occur quickly and with little to no warning. But, they 
also come to an end quickly as soon as the vulnerability is corrected. Meanwhile, kinetic 
weapons are durable and can remain effective for a long period of time. For such reasons, 
Phillips view cyberwarfare as asymmetric in comparison to the conventional domains of war.34 
 Libicki argues that incidents of cyberattacks transitioning to kinetic attacks have so far 
been proven quite unlikely by lack of evidence of such.35 He sees it as something that may occur, 
but with low probability. He also argues that cyberattacks would be less likely to cause a kinetic 
response because of their generally non-lethal nature and recovery rate.36 Other scholars argue 
that the concept of ‘kinetic cyber attacks’ have been around for about a decade and that such 
 
31 Elinor C. Sloan, “Modern Military Strategy: Cyberwar,” 142-159. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Andrew Phillips, “The Asymmetric Nature of Cyber Warfare,” 10-11.  
34 Ibid. 




attacks have been validated via the laboratory and in the operational environment. An example 
that is used is Stuxnet which was targeted malware used to destroy physical devices.37   
 Another contrast, that scholars highlight, between the cyber domain and the conventional 
domains of warfare is that cyberspace is ‘man-made.’ It can evolve very quickly under the 
discretion of various actors. The cyber domain is filled with a variety of actors from both the 
public and private domain and tracing the activity of such actors is not easy give the lack of 
structure. Scholars, such as Handler and Patterson, highlight that attribution is a key issue when 
it comes to differentiating between cyber and kinetic attacks. Patterson raises two challenges that 
attribution creates in the cyber domain.38 First, determining the identity of the actor behind the 
attack is challenging and often time consuming. Second, identifying whether the actor behind the 
attack is working in coordination with a nation state or is with a criminal non state entity group. 
The response for each type of attack would likely differ. Handler sees cyberspace as an active 
battleground for individuals, crime organizations, nation states, and other non-state actors (such 
as terrorist organizations. In addition to the identification problem that Patterson emphasizes, 
Handler also sees the attribution problem involving difficulty to determine intent and at what 
point do states get held responsible for malicious cyber activity that occurs within their borders.39  
Cyber Domain: A New Framework?  
 One the biggest debates among scholars surrounding the cyber domain is how applicable 
the existing framework of conventional war domains is to the cyber realm. There are multiple 
layers to this debate40 with some scholars arguing that cyberwar will never happen. But it is clear 
 
37 Scott Applegate, “The Dawn of Kinetic Cyber” 
38 Ryan Patterson, “Silencing The Call To Arms: A Shift Away From Cyber Attacks As Warfare,” 969-983. 
39 Stephenie G. Handler, “The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a Legal Approach to Accommodate Emerging 
Trends In Warfare,” 209- 237.  
40 As discussed in the literature review subsection entitled “Cyberwar: Strategic Thought” 
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that the cyber domain is a space of conflict whether or not one can see that progressing to full out 
war.  
 Some scholars consider cyberspace a fifth operational domain. Welch argues that the 
cyber domain needs to be treated like a place, just like other domains of war, in which military 
actions create some form of intended results.41 A nation state needs to be prepared to defend 
itself and conduct offensive mission in cyberspace, just like they may do on land, air, or sea. 
Considering cyberspace as another operational domain, some scholars argue that it will add new 
rules to the battlefield just like technological advancements have done in the past.42 For example, 
the time period between World War I and World War II brought long-range aircraft and radio 
coordinated ground-to-air attack methods. Hughes argues that such changes do not just bring an 
adjustment to an already existing framework of war but call for a completely new legal 
framework.43 He goes even beyond that to argue that a concrete framework may be difficult to 
develop in cyberspace due to the fluid nature of technology. He uses the lack of application of 
the international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber as an example.44 Schmitt, one of the authors 
behind the Tallin Manuel, sees existing legal framework applying to the cyber domain with some 
adjustments.45 Others, like Dipert, argue that legal frameworks are often problematic and not as 
applicable as should be to specific situations.46  
Looking Forward 
 There are a few common themes that can be drawn away from existing scholarship in this 
area of study. First, it is clear that a major issue in the cyber domain is lack of concrete 
 
41 Gen. Larry D. Welch, “Cyberspace: The Fifth Operational Domain,” 2-7.  
42 Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,” 106- 116. 
43 Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,” 106- 116. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Michael N. Schmitt, “Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.” 
46 Randall R. Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 284-410. 
 
 11 
definitions and lack of applicability to existing framework like the definitions that are put forth 
by the UN Charter. Second, there are several key differences between cyber and kinetic attacks. 
Most center around the factor that the cyber domain is less concrete and allows more flexibility 
and less predictability for a variety of actors. This lack of concrete domain gives way to the 
difficulty of attribution which may play a key role in response by other nations or organizations. 
Finally, most scholars agree that the cyber domain has a role in warfare. The disagreement 
comes in on how large of an impact that role has and whether it has a direct impact on kinetic 
warfare. After reviewing the existing literature surrounding the question of the differences 
between kinetic and cyber attacks and how that impacts response, it is possible to predict that 
this study will show a lack of a concrete framework specific to cyber attacks playing an impact 
on lack of response by the international community.  
Methodology and Hypothesis  
 To reiterate, the question that this study seeks to evaluate is how does the difference 
between cyber and kinetic attacks effect international response. The key idea behind this 
question is to understand the reason why response rate might be different and how that further 
impacts what occurs after a cyber attack. Based on existing literature and debate in the field, it is 
possible to hypothesize that due to the lack of concrete nature to the cyber domain and lack of 
applicability of the current conventional warfare framework, the response to cyber attacks is not 
as direct and persistent as with conventional attacks.  
 A qualitative social science method of research will be used to evaluate the question and 
test the above hypothesis. A comparative case study approach paired with coding evaluation of 
key primary sources in the field has been chosen as the most effective method of testing for this 
research. This will allow for the proper evaluation of the relationship and comparison of kinetic 
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and cyber attacks. The cyber domain is a rapidly evolving field with many actors involved with 
various intentions. Due to the lack of concrete framework in the field, it is best to look at recent, 
real incidents that occurred on the international platform. Two case studies involving Russia 
were chosen for the purpose of minimizing the variables involved. The first case study focuses 
on the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 where malicious cyber action transitioned to kinetic warfare. 
The second case study focuses on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in 2013 
and continues to this day. This conflict involves both cyber and kinetic activities. These case 
studies were chosen because they involve both cyber and kinetic action which allows for 
evaluation of how they may impact each other, and when response from the international 
community is most pronounced. For the comparative case study component, information will be 
gathered from news articles and primary sources such as press releases. The subsections for each 
case study will be broken up into background/kinetic attacks, cyber attacks, and international 
response. This will allow for comparison of each key issue area for the case study analysis. The 
variables that will be considered when evaluating both case studies are whether the attack falls 
into the legal framework for ‘armed attack’ and the level of response from the international 
community. For an ‘armed attack’ to exist47 there needs to be an international component to the 
conflict and there needs to be an armed use of force component to the conflict. The discussion of 
data will aim to analyze whether or not the attack had an international component and if there 
was use of armed forced based on the background provided in the case study. The level of 
response will be ranked with the options being none, verbal condemnation, physical intervention. 
The ranking will be drawn from the international response section of the case study.  
 
47 Refer to “Literature Review: Definitions” section for further guidance.  
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For the coding component of the data analysis, four congressional hearings will be used. 
Congressional hearings were chosen as the primary source type for content analysis because it 
would allow for a better understanding of how the United States envisions response to such 
conflict issues. In addition, it would likely highlight what the United States sees as the role of the 
international community in responding to conflict. Understanding both kinetic and cyber 
conflicts and the necessary response for both is crucial for the security of the United States, so it 
provides insight for the purpose of this research project to understand their perspective on the 
conflict and response.  Two of the congressional hearings focus on Georgia.48 The other two 
hearings take a look at the situation in Ukraine.49 The coding will draw on key themes that are 
seen in all four of the documents in an effort to see what discussion topics were prioritized 
during the congressional hearings and how that may impact the response to the case studies 
evaluated in this research.  
 There will be several key factors to consider in order to evaluate if the hypothesis that has 
been put forth is correct. First, the circumstances of the case study must meet the definition of an 
‘armed attack’ at some point in time. If there is an international component and use of force or 
violence component, then the circumstances can be considered an ‘armed attack’ for purposes of 
this research. Both kinetic and cyber attacks should ideally fall under this categorization, but due 
to the lack of concrete barriers in the cyber domain data analysis will show that cyber attacks are 
not categorized under the current framework of an ‘armed attack.’ Second, if the hypothesis 
follows correctly, the international response should rank higher for kinetic attacks than for cyber 
 
48 The first hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate is entitled “Russia’s Aggression 
Against Georgia: Consequences and Response” The second hearing before the Committee on Armed Services 
United States Senate is entitled “The Current Situation in Georgia and Implications For U.S. Policy” 
49 The first hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate entitled “Developments in 
Ukraine” The second hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on 
Armed Services United States Senate entitled “Russian Influence and Unconventional Warfare Operations In The 
‘Gray Zone’: Lessons From Ukraine”  
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attacks. Finally, the coding will have to show an increased focus on kinetic attacks and response 
than focus on the cyber domain. Overall, in order to view the hypothesis, put forth, as accurate 
there will need to be a clear focus on the kinetic as opposed to the cyber and this will be seen as 
directly impacting the response.  
Data 
Case Study 1: Georgia (2008) 
 
Background and Kinetic Attacks  
The war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 lasted for about a week, but the rising 
tensions stemed from years before. In 1990, South Ossetia declared its independence from 
Georgia.50 Just a year later, Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union and shortly 
after civil war broke out in the newly independent country. Abkhazia declared its independence 
from Georgia in 1992.51 After conflict between Abkhasian separatist and Georgian military a 
ceasefire was agreed upon in 1994 and peace was maintained until 2001.52 In September of 2002, 
Putin demanded that Georgia respond to accusations that they were harboring Chechen 
militants.53 In 2006, South Ossetians demanded independence. In 2007, Russia withdrew troops 
from Georgia. Their presence remained for peacekeeping purposes in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.54 Geographically, South Ossetia borders with Russia and residents are primarily Russian 
speaking. In August 2008, tensions between the two countries intensified over the South Ossetia 
region amongst talks of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO.55 At the end of May, Russia sent 
hundreds of unarmed troops to Abkhazia which Georgia interpreted as a setup for military 
 






55 CBS, “Russia Bombs Georgian Targets,” CBS.  
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intervention.56 On August 7th, Georgia sent troops to South Ossetia and Russia moved troops to 
the border and began air strikes in South Ossetia.57 By August 10th, Russian troops proceeded to 
move further into Georgia. The military action, which included intense bombing, came to an end 
on August 12th in what looked like a clear Russian victory.58 Both sides experienced many 
casualties, including civilian causalities.59 A ceasefire was negotiated in which President 
Medvedev of Russia promised recognition of independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia.60 The 
EU conducted an independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in which it was 
concluded that both sides contributed to the conflict.61 Georgia initiated the first military action 
on the capital of South Ossetia on August 7th, but the blame could not be laid solely on them as 
the action was taken because of years of rising tensions and provoking incidents.62  
Cyber Attacks  
 
Weeks before war broke out between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, various cyber 
organizations based in the United States noticed malicious cyber activity targeting Georgian 
government websites.63 Attacks against Georgia’s cyber domain began around July 20th with 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, as well as infiltration of government networks with 
the goal of stealing sensitive information and defacement of websites with propaganda.64 The 
main target of the attacks was the government, but media, communications, and transportation 
 
56 Ibid.  
57 CNN Editorial Research, “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts,” CNN World. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Reuters Staff, “Factbox: Facts about the 2008 War in Georgia,” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
georgia-war-conflict-sb/factbox-facts-about-the-2008-war-in-georgia-idUSTRE5732TH20090804. 
60 Ibid. 
61 European Union Council, “Independent International Fact- Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,” EU.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Joseph Nye, “Only a credible threat of response can deter cyber.” 




companies were also targeted.65 Georgia placed blame on Russia for the attacks, although Russia 
denied government involvement.66 According to cyber researchers, there seemed to be evidence 
connecting the malicious actions in the cyber domain to a Russian criminal gang known as the 
Russian Business Network (RBN).67 Computer security experts witnessed how the actors behind 
the malicious cyber operations staged botnets, malicious computer programs, in the lead up to 
the kinetic attacks. They were activated shortly before air strikes began on August 7th.68 
 
International Response  
 
The EU coordinated a ceasefire between the two fighting forces on August 12th.69 Russia 
recognized the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent and both countries agreed 
to withdraw forces to their pre-war positions. But Russian troops remained in the area, and took 
control of the established borders at the time.70  
 International intervention into the conflict began on August 8th when the United States, 
United Kingdom, and NATO called for a cease fire of military hostilities by both countries.71 
Just a day later, a delegation of diplomats from EU and the US went to Georgia in an effort to 
mitigate rising military tensions.72 There was international consensus from the West that 
Russia’s response was inappropriate. As a result, NATO and the EU disconnected with Russia, a 
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silence that lasted for about a year. The United States also sent ships to deliver aid to Georgia, in 
addition to the $4.5 billion that was offered in aid.73  
Ukraine (2013- Ongoing)74 
 
Background and Kinetic Attacks 
 
 Unrest at the end of 2013 with protests against President Viktor Yanukovych led into 
violence and chaos in 2014.75 One of the most critical tensions points between Russia and 
Ukraine at the time was Ukraine’s growing relationship with the European Union (EU). With 
increasing unrest and pressure, Yanukovych discarded the idea of formalizing a tighter economic 
relationship with the EU.76 At the same point, Russia was putting pressure on Ukraine to join the 
Eurasian Economic Union, which was just a concept at the time.77 With the ousting of 
Yanukovych from power, Russia saw an opportunity to reestablish its influence over Ukraine. 
Russian forces invaded Crimea on February 27th and increased their presence over bases in the 
region. Amid an unstable interim government in Ukraine, protests erupted in Crimea in March 
2014.78 Putin used force to protect Russian interests in the region. At that point, the Ukraine 
government deemed that Russia had launched a war against it. On March 25th, interim Ukrainian 
president Turchynov ordered the withdrawal of military forces from Crimea after Russian troops 
had taken over all the military bases.79  
In the eastern cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv, protests erupted in coordination 
with occupation of buildings. The government struggled to tame the protestors and the Russian 
 
73 Reuters, “Factbox: Facts about the 2008 war in Georgia,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-war-
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74 The conflict in Ukraine is still ongoing and it is noted so in the subheading but the focus of case study and 
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government used this to their advantage in calling out the Ukraine government in their inability 
to properly govern.80 Russian strategy differed in these eastern regions from its more militarily 
forceful approach in the annexation of Crimea. In Eastern Ukraine, Russia used a political-
warfare approach to undermine the influence of the Ukrainian government. As support for 
protest increased, Russia turned its focus to more conventional uses of force in Eastern Ukraine 
as well.81 At that point in time, Russia did not meet its goals in influencing the Ukrainian 
government to certain concessions. Tensions did not subside between the two countries. 
Ukrainian elections on May 25th, 2014 brought Petro Proshenko into power.82 It also brought him 
into a disorderly situation. Fighting among pro-Russian separatists and government forces 
intensified in April. Separatists established self-declared republics in the Luhansk and Donetsk 
regions.83 Even under new leadership, by August, thousands had been killed and thousands more 
left their homes.84  
Cyber Attacks 
In May 2014, as physical conflict escalated between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine’s 
presidential election was targeted by hackers when they broke into the Central Election 
Commission.85 Later in the year, hackers targeted the same entity during a parliamentary vote in 
October.86 In December 2015, with the malicious cyber activity persisting, the control centers of 
three electricity distribution companies were hacked.87 The hackers opened breakers at dozens of 
 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Council on Foreign Relations, “Ukraine in Crisis,” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-crisis. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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distribution substations in the Ivano-Frankvisk region which led to over 200,000 consumers 
losing power.88 The malicious actors had used a malware known as BlackEnergy to target 
companies with spear phishing emails that tricked employees into downloading corrupt files that 
led to the destruction of portions of the grid.89  The hacking intensified in 2016. In the months of 
November and December alone, Ukrainian state institutions were targeted by hackers about 
6,500 times.90 On December 17, 2016, a single transmission substation in northern Kiev lost 
power. The power cut resulted in a loss of about one-fifth of Kiev’s power consumption at that 
time.91 One of the world’s most financially damaging cyber attacks took place in 2017 in 
Ukraine. The malware, NotPetya, was used to compromise software that granted the hackers 
access to computer systems of utility companies, banks, airports, and government agencies. It 
went further to effect large corporations such as FedEx.92 The estimated damages and recovery 
cost was about $10 billion dollars on an international scale.93  
International Response 
 After Russia invaded Crimea in early 2014, the White House issued a warning to Russia 
in regard to the risk it was running of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty.94 NATO also ordered 
Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine.95 Shortly after, the United States offered financial 
support to Ukraine in the form of one billion dollars in loan.96 On March 6, 2015, President 
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Obama issued an executive order declaring a national emergency in regard to the situation in 
Ukraine.97 In August, with the Ukrainian crisis nearing no conclusion, the UN security council 
met in an emergency session and the US national security council met at the White House.98 The 
United States moved forward with more economic sanctions, but stayed away from military 
intervention as to not increase conflict in an already burdened military zone.99  
 Ukrainian investigators worked relatively quickly to find the perpetrators of the cyber 
attacks that were growing in intensity. They discovered that the hackers were Russian speaking. 
The grid attacks were predicted to be connected to a group called Advanced Persistent Threat 28 
(APT28).100 The group is known to have ties to the Russian government. Its record of attacks 
includes the Ukrainian Election Commission101 and the U.S. Democratic National Committee. In 
February 2016, U.S. deputy Energy Secretary Elizabeth Sherwood- Randall attributed the 2015 
attack to Russia.102 But most U.S. officials were hesitant to do so as they felt that there was not 
enough evidence to come to a conclusive claim. In the aftermath, investigators discovered that 
APT28 may in fact not be the ones behind the 2015 attack, instead suspecting the Sandworm 
Team.103 The Sandworm Team is another Russian-hacking group which has a reputation of 
targeting foreign government organizations.  
 International response intensified with the NotPetya ransomware attack that cost the 
world billions of dollars in damage. Although Russia denied its involvement in the attack, the 
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international community did not hold back in attributing the attack to them. The UK Defense 
Secretary at the time, Gavin Williamson, argued that Russia was breaking the rules of the 
international community and that the UK will not hold back in responding to such violations.104 
The United States also did not hold back on blaming the attack on Russia. The former White 
House Press Secretary, Sarah Sanders, represented the administration in expressing that the cyber 
attack was reckless and that the attackers would face international consequences.105 A researcher 
at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence made statements on the legal 
issues that the perpetrators of the attack could face including a possible violation of sovereignty. 
The official elaborated that countermeasures taken by the international community may be 
justified if the attack is attributed to the state.106 
Coding of Congressional Hearings 
 Close analysis and coding of the congressional testimony for both Georgia107 and 
Ukraine108 revealed key themes that emphasized trends that benefited the analysis of the issue at 
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hand. The major themes observed are conflict, military109, political110, cyber111, assistance, and 
response112. In order to provide a balanced analysis for all four congressional testimonies, the 
same common themes were applied to both the Ukraine and Georgia hearings. The documents 
ranged from 54-63 pages. Table 1 below is the code chart for Georgia using two congressional 
hearings that both took place in 2008 around the time of the conflict. Table 2 below is the code 
chart for Ukraine using two congressional hearings. One of the hearings took place at the 
beginning of the conflict in 2014 and the other hearing took place in 2017, close to the end of the 
conflict period that was used for the case study analysis above. The code count notes the number  
of times each theme is mentioned within the individual hearings (the order of which is noted in 
the footnote numbered next to the Table title). The bolded number in the code count is the total 
times the mentioned theme arises in the hearings.113  
Table 1: Georgia Case Study Congressional Hearings Coding Table114  





Conflict 73 42 115 
Military 64 32 96 
Political 8 10 18 
Cyber 16 1 17 
Assistance  37 38 75 
        Economical  13 17 30 
Response 92 66 158 
 
109 For both coding tables, this category accounts for military conflict, aggression, and action related specifically to 
the Georgia conflict (2008) and the Ukraine conflict (2013-Ongoing). 
110 For both coding tables, this category accounts for political conflict and action related specifically to the Georgia 
conflict (2008) and the Ukraine conflict (2013-Ongoing). 
111 For both coding tables, this category accounts for cyber conflict, malicious activity, and aggression related 
specifically to the Georgia conflict (2008) and the Ukraine conflict (2013-Ongoing).  
112 This accounts for both international response and United States response.   
113 For consistency, the code count includes both verbal and written testimony presented in the hearing document. 
Some overlap is present.  
114 The first hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate is entitled “The Current 
Situation in Georgia and Implications For U.S. Policy.” (Code Count 1 in Table 1) The second hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate is entitled “Russia’s Aggression Against Georgia: 





Table 2: Ukraine Case Study Congressional Hearings Coding Table115   
 





Conflict 2 26 28 
Military  25 41 66 
Political  12 23 35 
Cyber  3 33 36 
Assistance  30 5 35 
        Economical  7 3 10 
Response 50 38 88 
 
Discussion  
 To reiterate the hypothesis put forth was that due to the lack of concrete nature to the 
cyber domain and lack of applicability of the current conventional warfare framework, the 
response to cyber attacks is not as direct and persistent as with conventional attacks. To evaluate 
this hypothesis, two case studies and content analysis via coding of primary sources were used as 
data. What follows is a discussion on how the data matched the criteria that was established in 
the methodology section above.  
Is this an Armed Attack?  
 In the case studies, the background/kinetic attack and cyber attacks subsections provided 
an understanding of how adequately each scenario fits under the definition of ‘armed attack’ as 
the framework currently has it established. Two factors need to be considered: international 
component and whether use of force was involved. For the Georgia case study kinetic attack, it is 
clear that the attack had both an international component and that use of force was involved. 
Military forces were used by both Georgia and Russia. Military action included intense bombing 
 
115 The first hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate entitled “Developments in 
Ukraine.” (Code Count 1 in Table 2) The second hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate entitled “Russian Influence and 
Unconventional Warfare Operations In The ‘Gray Zone’: Lessons From Ukraine” (Code Count 2 in Table 2) 
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and casualties included civilian causalities. In regard to the cyber attack component of the 
conflict, there was an international component as it played a role beyond the borders of just one 
country, but it was not clear right away who was behind the attack. Georgia blamed Russia 
although Russia denied responsibility. It is important to recall that in order for a conflict to 
qualify as international armed conflict, the use of force needs to be conducted by the state.116 
This is an issue area that arises when dealing with cyber attacks where responsibility for an 
attack is denied by the state. The cyber attack also did not qualify as direct use of force. Instead, 
there was infiltration of government networks. This led to acquisition of confidential information 
and a stream of propaganda across several critical industries. The cyber attack, on its own, does 
not meet the criteria of an ‘armed attack.’  
For the Ukraine case study there is a similar trend. With the kinetic attacks, it is clear that 
there is both an international component and that use of force is involved to achieve a certain 
goal. Russian forces invaded Crimea at a time where the Ukraine government was vulnerable 
and in transition. Russia also turned to conventional use of force in Eastern Ukraine where 
fighting among pro-Russian separatists and government forces led to thousands of deaths. The 
cyber attacks, occurring on several occasions from 2014-2017, had international implications. 
The attackers targeted critical infrastructure within Ukraine leaving thousands without power. 
Again, it was not clear who the perpetrator of the attacks was. For example, Ukraine 
investigators first attributed the 2015 power grid hack to APT28, but later turned to The 
Sandworm Team as the ones behind that attack. Both groups are Russian-hacking groups that 
have a reputation of targeting critical infrastructure and foreign government organizations. Both 
also have potential ties to the Russian government, although the Russian government has had a 
 
116 This is noted in the Definitions section of the literature review.  
 
 25 
record of denial. Further, the malware NotPetya was used in 2017 to affect a variety of critical 
infrastructure and large corporations including airports and government agencies around the 
world. This led to about $10 billion dollars in recovery cost. But, no direct use of force was used 
nor did it directly lead to any deaths. Although it is key to consider how thousands of individuals 
losing power may affect their lifestyle and may even indirectly lead to loss of life, according to 
the current framework such action would not be considered an ‘armed attack.’ In the literature 
review, it was noted that after legal review under the Obama administration, United States 
officials began to recognize cyber attacks under Article 51 for self defense if such attacks 
damaged critical infrastructure. In this example, there was critical infrastructure damaged but 
since that view point was not necessarily adopted internationally it is not applied in that way to 
this study.  
 The implications of this trend, as illustrated in both case studies, are that the existing 
framework of ‘armed attack’ does not match up with attacks that occur in the cyber domain even 
if they parallel or in some way play a role in kinetic attacks like seen in the cases studied. This 
speaks to the part of the hypothesis that looks at the existing framework applying to kinetic 
attacks versus cyber attacks. Malicious cyber activity, such as the ones described in the case 
studies, are often categorized as ‘attacks’ because they negatively impact large groups of people 
in an effort to achieve some political goal. But if they do not properly fall into a framework that 
has been used to deal with armed conflict on an international scale, it is difficult to predict a 
balanced response to such action. This is a reason why other countries may be hesitant to 
respond; they do not know what the rules are.  
A common issue that can be seen is an issue of attribution. As previously noted in the 
literature review section of the paper, one of the key differences between kinetic and cyber 
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attacks is the concrete, direct nature of the kinetic domain versus the fluid, often indirect nature 
of the cyber domain. There is no doubt when Russia sends military troops across the border to 
Ukraine that the Russian government is behind such action. When a group such as APT28, a 
group known to have ties with the Russian government, is suspected of committing a cyber 
attack in the midst of a conflict between Georgia and Russia one can assume that the Russian 
government has some role in the attack. But it would seem that the international community 
would have some hesitation to act solely on grounds of suspected attribution.  
How does the International Community respond? 
Table 3: International Community Response Ranking   
 Kinetic  Cyber  
Georgia  Intervention  None-Verbal Condemnation  
Ukraine  Intervention  Verbal Condemnation  
 
 To analyze the international response to the kinetic and cyber attack in Georgia and 
Ukraine, a ranking system is used. The scale is as follows: none, verbal condemnation, 
intervention117. The results are summarized in Table 3 above. Based on the Georgia case study, 
EU coordinated a ceasefire between the two countries. The United States also sent aid to 
Georgia. A delegation of diplomats was sent to Georgia by the EU and the US to mitigate 
military tensions. Although no direct military action had to be taken by international forces, 
financial and diplomatic actions were effective in concluding the fighting. Direct intervention 
from the international community was necessary in stopping the military conflict between 
Georgia and Russia.  
 
117 Intervention can include economic sanctions, financial or other support, or physical involvement.  
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The cyber attacks in Georgia occurred just prior to the escalation of military conflict. 
Government, media, and transportation company networks were hacked. Computer security 
experts confirmed that malicious computer programs were staged leading up to the kinetic 
attacks. The international community stayed mostly silent on the issue at the time. In the 
aftermath, there was some verbal acknowledgement and Table 3 attempts to reflect that by 
noting a cross over between no response and verbal condemnation. Could the situation play out 
differently if the malicious cyber activity was properly acknowledged by the international 
community? It is possible but considering the variety of other factors that could have been 
involved it is impossible to provide a concrete answer within this research study.  
  Looking at the Ukraine case study, there was direct intervention when it came to the 
kinetic attacks. NATO ordered Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and the United States 
offered financial support to Ukraine. President Obama also declared a national emergency in 
regard to the circumstances in Ukraine. With the conflict intensifying, the United States imposed 
economic sanctions on Russia. Cyber attacks were acknowledged with verbal condemnation. 
Most U.S. officials were hesitant, at first, to make any official comments on the attacks as they 
felt like there was a lack of evidence for attribution. Only when the attacks intensified to the 
point of financially impacting the international community did the United States turn to verbally 
condemning the actions taken by Russia, although once again Russia denied its involvement. 
This raises an interesting point. When the cyber attacks affected Ukraine directly and Ukrainian 
investigators blamed Russia, the international community was hesitant to back them in 
condemning Russia. But when the attacks grew to a more international focus with billions of 
dollars in damages and recovery, the world grew more interested. Countries promised 
international consequences. Was it more clear on an international scale that countries can 
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respond? In addition to attribution once again being an area of concern, it would seem like level 
of international impact or damage also seemed to play a role. This would be another reason to 
question the applicability of the existing framework. Countries could be hesitant to act because 
they are not sure when the legal guidelines apply. This was an issue area that the experts behind 
the Tallin Manual attempted to tackle. They wrestled with trying to apply the existing framework 
to cyber activities, but was that sufficient when response action is still not clear?  
Congressional Hearings 
 The United States Senate held congressional hearings to discuss both the Georgia conflict 
and the ongoing Ukraine conflict. The main focus of the hearings was to discuss developments 
on the issue at hand, consequences, and potential avenues of response by the United States and 
its international partners. A close reading was conducted of the chosen primary sources and 
several key themes were drawn out as highlighted in the data section above. The key themes 
highlighted a potential trend of how the United States approaches conflicts that involve both 
kinetic and cyber components.  
There are several key observations that can be drawn from the content analysis conducted 
on the congressional hearings. First, there is a clear focus on military and political conflict over 
cyber conflict. In the testimonies on the situation in Georgia, the topic of military conflict is 
discussed 96 times. Meanwhile, the cyber conflict topic is discussed 17 times. For the Ukraine 
situation, there is a smaller but still rather significant margin between the two.118 The second 
Ukraine hearing entitled “Russian Influence and Unconventional Warfare Operations in The 
‘Gray Zone’: Lessons From Ukraine,” provides the smallest margin between the military and 
cyber conflict code count. At close read, there are some key observations that could be drawn 
 
118 If one had to predict why the margin was smaller for the Ukraine situation was because there was a larger amount 
of cyber attacks that occurred and the situation lasts significantly longer than the Georgia situation.  
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here because this hearing touches on the topic of how unconventional warfare, such as cyber 
activity and disinformation campaigns, were used to Russia’s advantage before the international 
community could respond by traditional means. Interestingly, this hearing takes places the latest 
(in 2017) in comparison to the other hearings which take place between 2008 and 2014. It is 
worthwhile to consider if timing plays a role here. In 2017, it is quite possible that officials are 
becoming more aware of the looming possibilities of cyber conflict and seeing it play out in 
actions in such instances as the Ukraine conflict. Some of the testimony during the hearing 
touches on motivations for Russia to conduct cyber attacks or exploitations. The motivation can 
be predicted to be similar to that of kinetic attacks in the sense that a certain country aims to 
achieve particular political goals. If the end goal is the same for these difference forms of attack, 
it is critical to consider how this may impact response.  
 What the code count fails to show on the surface, but what can be identified at close read 
of the testimonies, is that the response is mostly focused on financial assistance and diplomatic 
intervention when it comes to military or political conflict. The topic of cyber conflict, when 
acknowledged, revolves around how the United States and the international community should 
respond. It is interesting to note, that in comparison to the case studies where there is very little 
direct response to the cyber attacks, the testimonies do acknowledge the cyber threat and discuss 
response. One of the key issue areas that is identified is that the United States and the 
international community need to prepare to respond to such attacks in the future. This could lead 
one to believe that officials understand the cyber threat, they are just still tackling with how to 
properly deal with it.  
What has been learned? 
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 As a reminder the hypothesis for this research project was due to the lack of concrete 
nature to the cyber domain and lack of applicability of the current conventional warfare 
framework, the response to cyber attacks is not as direct and persistent as with conventional 
attacks. It is clear that cyber attacks are addressed in a different manner than conventional attacks 
and it is possible that, in part, this occurs due to lack of applicability of the current conventional 
warfare. But a few observations have been drawn out of the data analysis that were not the focus 
of the hypothesis but seem to play a key role in the issue area.  
First, the issue of attribution seems to play a central role in the response delay faced by 
cyber attacks. This likely stems from the fluid nature of cyber attacks, as opposed to the more 
concrete nature of kinetic attacks. International actors are hesitant to respond when attacks are 
not clearly attributed to a certain entity.  
Second, level of international impact plays a role. This seems to stem from the idea of a 
lack of framework for cyber attacks. International actors do not know how to respond because 
they do not know the rules they should be following when it comes to cyber attacks. When does 
everybody agree that a line has been drawn? Is it when a community is left without power for 24 
hours or when there is loss of life? Cyber attacks operate in their own domain and therefore it 
seems like they need their own rulebook. This is highlighted by the fact that cyber attacks do not 
fall under the current definition of ‘armed attack.’ If they do not, countries are hesitant to act in 
self-defense but defense is clearly needed to send a message to malicious state actors.  
Finally, the congressional hearings were able to highlight that officials acknowledge that 
both a cyber and kinetic conflict exist. But they group them separately and talk about response 
separately. This is revealed from close reading of the hearings, but excludes the hearing entitled 
“Russian Influence and Unconventional Warfare Operations in the ‘Gray Zone’: Lessons From 
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Ukraine” because, as mentioned previously, this hearing engaged more with the concept of cyber 
conflict. This again highlights that the cyber domain is unique and needs its own framework to 
function. The United States, as displayed in the hearings, acknowledges that there is work to be 
done in the cyber domain.  
Based on lack of applicability to the categorization of an ‘armed attack,’ clear difference 
in international response, and acknowledgement by United States officials that there is work in 
the cyber domain that needs to be done, it can be seen that a new framework is required to deal 
with cyber conflict on the international stage. Some researchers have argued for amending the 
current framework, some have argued that malicious cyber activity should not even be 
considered a domain of war. Based on the data presented in this study, it can be argued that 
amending the current framework is not enough. A new framework needs to be established where 
attribution, what level of cyber attack justifies international response, and how the international 
community should prepare for future cyber attacks are all addressed.  
Conclusion     
Limitations  
 As evident through the research process described above, the cyber field is constantly 
changing. It is not concrete in nature and new cyber interactions between states reveal new 
potential capabilities. It is currently not clear what each state is capable of when it comes to 
cyber actions. Therefore, this study was limited by the lack of accessibility to the potentially 
most recent information on the topics, as well as in case study selection. There are not many 
incidents of kinetic and cyber attacks occurring under the same conflict. This limited selection 
makes it difficult to understand if the conclusions drawn above in the discussion section are 
applicable to the cyber domain in general. It also important to consider that this understanding is 
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likely to grow and change as new information about the cyber domain is obtained and 
understood by researchers.  
 Due to constraints placed on this research project, a limited number of congressional 
hearings could be selected for content analysis. Although, the patterns that were noted spanned 
the majority of the testimonies, it would be interesting to expand on this analysis to understand if 
this pattern would continue with analysis of more primary sources.  
Future Research  
 As acknowledged in the limitations subsection above, the cyber domain is constantly 
evolving. This research serves to be a foundation for a growing research topic that will evolve as 
the cyber domain itself evolves and as asymmetric warfare becomes a continued focus of 
malicious state and non-state actors. This research paper acknowledged the need for a cyber 
attack framework for international response. Such a framework would ideally promote 
accountability on the part of nation states that currently remain non-compliant in their cyber 
domain actions. Further research can look to what a framework like this should entail and what 
needs to be done for it be developed. A framework to address this issue can take on several 
forms whether it is legal guidance set forth by international organizations in coordination with 
nation states or some form of a specific, agreed upon treaty or document between nation states. 
Further research would entail understanding what would work best in this regard. Understanding 
case study situations like the ones used for this study can help the United States and its 
international allies understand what kind of unique issues cyber attacks raise in their relationship 
with kinetic attacks and conflict with other nation states. As cyber attacks between nation states 
are on the rise, this issue becomes more urgent. The international community needs to be 
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